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OIL PIPE LINE DIVORCEMENT BY
LITIGATION AND LEGISLATION
FORREST R. BLACK
One of the strangest chapters in any comprehensive history of the struggle
for government regulation of business in America must be reserved to relate
the successful strategy of the major oil companies in escaping or thwarting
federal regulation of their interstate oil pipe line carriers. In resum6, that
story might be stated as follows. Oil pipe line carriers escaped federal regula-
tion in the Interstate Commerce Act of 18871 and in the Elkins Act of 1903.2
Both of these statutes were limited to rail or rail and water carriers only and
sought to prevent discriminations and rebates. The next great wave of com-
mon carrier reform culminated in the enactment of the Hepburn Act of
1906.3 Here again oil pipe lines scored a victory by escaping the Commodities
Clause section of that act, but appeared to suffer a defeat by having impressed
upon them the common carrier status in the so-called Pipe Line Amendment
of the act. But later developments have demonstrated that the Hepburn Act,
in its entirety, must be characterized as a Pyrrhic victory for the public insofar
as oil pipe lines are concerned.
More than a quarter century elapsed, and on April 3, 1933, President Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt in an open letter to the Governors of seventeen oil producing
states said:
"The Report of the Independent Petroleum Association Opposed to
Monopoly recommends 'the enactment of emergency legislation by Con-
gress divorcing oil pipe lines engaged in interstate commerce from other
branches of the oil industry.' I am of the opinion that this is a reasonable
request and that such legislation should be enacted at as early a date as
possible."
More than six years later, Senators Borah and Gillette, on April 17, 1939,
introduced in the Senate -of the United States a bill (S. 2181) to prohibit
interstate common carrier pipe lines from transporting commodities in which
such carriers have any interest. It should also be noted that in the early days
of the Roosevelt administration, Congress amended the National Industrial
Recovery Act, authorizing, under certain circumstances, pipe line divorcement
under Section 9, Clause (b), which provided that "the President is authorized
to institute proceedings to divorce from any holding company any pipe line
124 STAT. 379 (1887), 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 1 et seq.
232 STAT. 847 (1903), 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 41-43.
334 STAT. 584 (1906), 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 1 et seq. For a general discussion of the legal
status of oil pipe lines, see ScHARFMAN,'THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE CoMMIssIoN (1931)
vol. II, pp. 96-105.
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company controlled by such holding company which pipe line by unfair prac-
tices or by exorbitant rates in the transportation of petroleum or its products,
tends to create a monopoly." But no action was ever taken under this section.
To revert to a more detailed analysis of the earlier attempts at regulation, it
should be noted that the Commodities Clause is important for the reason that
it was the first legislative attempt to divorce production and transportation.
On May 7, 1906, while the Hepburn Bill was before the Senate for considera-
tion, Senator Elkins offered an amendment prohibiting any common carrier
from engaging in the production, manufacture, buying, furnishing or selling
of any commodity in competition with any shipper over its lines. As passed
by the Congress, this section was amended so as to substitute for the words
"common carrier" the words "railroad company." Senator Tillman, comment-
ing on this change, said: "It simply means in plain English that the Standard
Oil Company has got in its work. . . .We release the Standard Oil people
entirely from the control of the provision which divorces the producers of
commodities from the transportation of commodities." 4
The Pipe Line Amendment of the Hepburn Act provided that "this Act
shall apply to any person or persons engaged in the transportation of oil or
other commodity, except water and except natural or artificial gas, by means of
pipe lines, or partly by pipe lines and partly by railroad, or partly by pipe
lines and partly by water, who shall be considered and held to be common
carriers within the meaning and purpose of this Act." But in spite of the
fact that the common carrier status of these pipe lines has been legislatively
declared, administratively interpreted 5 and judicially upheld,6 the uniform
practice of the major pipe line companies, in the language of the Supreme
Court of the United States, has been to carry "all oil offered, if only the
offerers will sell at their price, . .. "7
Although the pipe line companies have been filing tariffs with the Interstate
Commerce Commission ever since the decision in the Pipe Line Cases in 1914,
because of the dominating position of the major oil companies who own 92%
of the pipe line mileage and because of the passive attitude of the government,
we have the strange result that the major pipe line companies have not in
fact performed the primary function of a common carrier, i.e., the transporta-
tion of other people's goods. And during this period of a quarter of a century,
there has only been one formal complaint filed with the Interstate Commerce
Commission by an independent oil producer who desired to take advantage of
the common carrier facilities of a pipe line company. In Brundred Brothers v.
'40 CONG. Rxc. 9101 (1906).
'In the Matter of Pipe Lines, 24 I. C. C. 1 (1912).
'The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548, 34 Sup. Ct. 956 (1914).71d. at 560. (Italics supplied.)
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Prairie Pipe Line Co., 8 the prospective shipper complained of the rates and of
the tender requirement of the pipe line company. The Interstate Commerce
Commission held that the rates were reasonable, but that the minimum tender
requirement of 100,000 barrels was unreasonable, and suggested 10,000 barrels
as a reasonable minimum tender requirement. The aftermath of this partial
victory of the only independent oil producer who has ever made a formal com-
plaint before the Interstate Commerce Commission is interesting. The Prairie
Pipe Line Company immediately cancelled the particular tariff between the
two points in question: the prospective shipper's oil was not carried; no
further complaint was filed and there the matter rests.
Dean Pound has stressed the distinction between "law in books" and "law
in action,"9 and here indeed is a significant illustration. It is our thesis that the
fundamental explanation of this anomaly 10 lies in the fact (a) that the major
oil producing companies, who control the pipe lines, are in a position to and
do establish the market price for oil in the production field, and (b) that
they control the market price at the point of destination, and (c) that the
differential between the two prices is not sufficient to cover the cost of trans-
portation in conformity with the tariffs filed with the Interstate Commerce
Commission. As we see it, the most vulnerable point in the pipe line set-up
today grows out of the fact that the major pipe lines are acting in the dual
and inconsistent roles of carriers and owners (dealers) of the commodity
transported, and that they are using the pipe line charges as a driving wedge
to prevent others from marketing oil lawfully produced, and in order to con-
summate that objective they are deviating from the published tariffs required
by law and are attempting to assume the loss as a "dealer" rather than as a
"carrier." If this charge can be established by evidence it is our contention that
there is a possibility of partial relief by litigation under existing statutes, but
this relief will not be as effective as divorcement by legislation.
Before attempting to explore the possibilities of litigation under existing
statutes, one point by way of background must be emphasized. If the pipe
line is owned and controlled by the oil producer and thus occupies the dual
and inconsistent roles of public carrier and private dealer, then under these
circumstances (1) the so-called reasonableness or unreasonableness of the
transportation rate is immaterial insofar as the producer-owner of the pipe
line is concerned, for the reason that his profits are determined by the differ-
ential between the selling, price and the production cost (which includes re-
fining and marketing costs) plus the traasportation cost, and not plus the
868 I. C. C. 458 (1922).
'See Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action (1910) 44 Am. L. REv. 12.
"Other contributing factors may be tender requirements, storage facilities, etc.
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transportation rate. The transportation rate is a matter of bookkeeping only.
But (2) the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the established transporta-
tion rate is pertinent to other shippers, and in a monopolistic market the amount
of the transportation rate may constitute the driving wedge which will place
the independent producer in a position where he cannot afford to take advan-
tage of the common carrier status of the pipe line to market his oil which has
been lawfully produced. By force of circumstances, he is compelled to sell his
oil at the pipe line at a dictated price.
As early as 1891, the Interstate Commerce Commission, in a case involving
the coal-railroads, made this point very clear in Coxe Brothers & Company v.
Lehigh Valley R. R.,11 but the most succinct statement of the proposition was
made by the Commission in 1911 in the case of Meeker & Co. v. Lehigh Valley
R. R., when it said :12
"... The record shows that the only line of demarcation between the
Lehigh Valley Railroad Company and the Lehigh Valley Coal Company
is one of bookkeeping. Assuming for purposes of illustration that the cost
of mining anthracite coal is $2 per ton and the cost of carrying it to tide-
water is $1 per ton, it follows that the cost of coal at tidewater would be
$3 per ton; and if the published rate were $1 the independent operator
and the railroad coal company would be on a fair competitive basis so far
as the cost of mining and transportation are concerned. But as between
the railroad company and its coal company it matters not whether the profit
comes from mining or transporting the coal. So, therefore, if, instead
of the $1 rate above mentioned, the railroad company were to establish a
rate of $1.50 per ton, the railroad and its coal company could still sell
coal at tidewater for $3 per ton, standing a deficit of 50 cents per ton in
the mining price and making an equal profit in the transportation price.
But the independent operator cannot recoup himself in this manner, and
the best price that he could make at tidewater would necessarily be the
mining price of $2, plus the carrying charge of $1.50, or $3.50; and he
would enter the market at a disadvantage of 50 cents per ton as compared
with the railroad and its coal company. It is obvious that such an ad-
vantage would enable the railroad company and its alter ego, the coal
company, to monopolize the field of production and the selling inarket."
(Italics supplied.)
I. DIVORCEMENT By LITIGATION
Although, in the literature dealing with the problem of the divorcement
of the production from the transportation of oil, it is generally assumed that
this is a matter exclusively within the province of legislation, it is our conten-
tion that a partial relief can be secured by litigation. The analysis that follows is
predicated upon an assumed state of facts outlined supra. Two possibilities
"4 I. C. C. 535, 569, 571, 572 (1890).
"21 I. C. C. 129, 154 (1911).
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of divorcement by litigation will be considered: (A) the "rebate-device"
sections of the Interstate Commerce Act and (B) the Sherman Act.
A. LITIGATION BASED ON THE "REBATE-DEvIcE" SECTIONS OF T1E
INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT
(1) Statutory Provisions
Section 2 of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U3. S. C. A. § 2) provides:
"Sec. 2. That if any common carrier subject to the provisions of this
act shall, directly or indirectly, by any special rate, rebate, drawback, or
other device, charge, demand, collect, or receive from any person or
persons a greater or less compensation for any service rendered, or to be
rendered, in the transportation of passengers, or property, subject to the
provisions of this act, than it charges, demands, collects, or receives from
any other person or persons for doing for him or them a like and con-
temporaneous service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic under
substantially similar circumstances and conditions, such common carrier
shall be deemed guilty of unjust discrimination, which is hereby prohibited
and declared to be unlawful."
Section 1 of the Elkins Act'3 [49 U. S. C. A. § 41 (1)] provides:
"Sec. 1.... It shall be unlawful for any person, persons, or corporations
to offer, grant, or give or to solicit, accept, or receive any rebate, con-
cession, or discrimination in respect to the transportation of any property
in interstate or foreign commerce by any common carrier subject to said
chapter whereby any such property shall by any device whatever be trans-
ported at a less rate than that named in the tariffs published and filed by
such carrier, as is required by said chapter, or whereby any other ad-
vantage is given or discrimination is practiced. .. .
(2) The New Haven Doctrine
The most apposite decision that can be utilized as a basis for divorcement
by litigation under the Interstate Commerce Act is New York, New Haven and
Hartford R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Commission.'4 The New Haven de-
cision antedated the Hepburn Act.15 It applied to railroads, but the effect
of the Pipe Line Amendment of the Hepburn Act16 makes the doctrine
"Section 3 of the Elkins Act as amended, which was 'part of the Hepburn Act of 1906,'
provides that, in addition to other penalties provided by the act, any person, etc., who shall
knowingly receive any rebates, direct or indirect, shall forfeit to the United States a sum
of money three thnes the amount of money so received or accepted.
1200 U. S. 361, 26 Sup. Ct. 272 (1906).
'-The New Haven decision was handed down on February 19, 1906, and the Hepburn
Act was approved on June 29, 1906; 34 STAT. 584 (1906), 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 1 et seq.
'The Pipe Line Amendment provides "that the provisions of this Act shall apply to any
person or persons engaged in the transportation of oil or other commodity, except water
and except natural or artificial gas, by means of Pipe lines or partly by pipe lines and partly
by railroad, or partly by pipe line and partly by water, who shall be considered and
PIPE LINE DIVORCEMENT
of the case applicable to oil pipe lines. The question of statutory con-
struction of the Pipe Line Amendment immediately arose. Did the con-
cluding clause of that amendment confine the Commission's jurisdiction to
pipe Jines that were technically common carriers by virtue of their own conduct
(i.e., a holding out as such), or did it impress upon all pipe lines engaged in
interstate transportation the status of common carriers and subject them to
control? In the Matter of Pipe Lines,17 the Interstate Commerce Commission
held that, regardless of their previous status, the obligations of common
carriers were impressed upon them, even though they were built over
privately acquired rights of way and even though, by resorting to the policy
of refusing to carry oil unless it was first sold to them, they were apparently
engaged in transporting only their own oil. This broad construction of the
Pipe Line Amendment was affirmed by the Commerce Court in the case of
Prairie Oil and Gas Co. v. United States, where the court held :'s
"The concluding phrase is not a limitation or restriction, but, on the
contrary, was plainly inserted for the purpose of fixing the legal status of
the persons and corporations included in precise terms in the preceding
description, to the end that they should be regarded and treated as common
carriers subject to the act.... So far as the debates in Congress when this
amendment was pending may be resorted to for any purpose, they tend
strongly to confirm the conclusion above expressed."
The Supreme Court of the United States was in entire agreement with both
the Commission and the Commerce Court on the point of statutory con-
struction. In The Pipe Line Cases, which is the leading authority construing
the provisions of the Hepburn Act applicable to oil pipe lines, Mr. Justice
Holmes repudiated the Pogue"9 and Splawn 20 contentions that pipe lines were
"plant facilities" and said :21
"The provisions of the act are to apply to any person engaged in the
transportation of oil by means of pipe lines. The words 'who shall be
considered and held to be common carriers within the meaning and purpose
of this act' obviously are not intended to cut down the generality of the
held to be common carriers within the meaning and purpose of this Act." (Italics
supplied.)1724 I. C. C. 1 (1912).
"204 Fed. 798, 805, 806 (Commerce Ct. 1913).
"POGUE, ECONOMICS OF PIPE LINE TRANSPORTATION IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY(1932).
'The Walter M. W. Splawn Report on Pipe Lines, H. R. REP. No. 2192, 72d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1933) Part I, page lxviii. A recent ex parte report by Examiner E. Paul Kelly
of the Interstate Commerce Commission submitted to the Commission Feb. 1, 1940, entitled
Reduced Pipe Line Rates and Gathering Charges, has revived the Splawn "plant facility"
thesis in spite of the holdings of the Interstate Commerce Commission [In the Matter of
Pipe Lines, 24 I. C. C. 1 (1912)] and the Supreme Court of the United States [The Pipe
Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548, 34 Sup. Ct. 956 (1914)].
2234 U. S. 548, 559, 561, 34 Sup. Ct. 956 (1914).
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previous declaration to the meaning that only those shall be held common
carriers within the act who were common carriers in a technical sense,
but an injunction that those in control of pipe lines and engaged in the
transportation of oil shall be dealt with as such. If the Standard Oil Co.
and its cooperating companies were not so engaged, no one was. It not
only would be a sacrifice of fact to form, but would empty the act if the
carriage to the seaboard of nearly all the oil east of California were held
not to be transportation within its meaning, because by the exercise of
their power the carriers imposed as a condition to the carriage a sale to
themselves. As applied to them, while the amendment does not compel
them to continue in operation it does require them not to continue except
as common carriers .... Its evident purpose was to bring within its scope
pipe lines that although not technically common carriers yet were carrying
all oil offered, if only the offerers would sell at their price.... Those lines
that we are considering are common carriers now in everything but form.
They carry everybody's oil to market, although they compel outsiders to
sell it before taking it into their pipes." (Italics supplied.)
In the New Haven case, the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad made a contract
with the New Haven Railroad to sell to the latter during a period of years a
specified amount of coal at the price of $2.75 per ton. The Chesapeake &
Ohio bought this coal for $2.47 per ton, leaving a balance of $.28 per ton for
transportation costs. The published tariff on these shipments was $1.45 per
ton. The question for decision as formulated by the Court was stated as
follows: "Has a carrier, engaged in interstate commerce, the power to contract
to sell and transport in completion of the contract the commodities sold, when
the price stipulated in the contract does not, pay the cost of purchase, the cost
of delivery and the published freight rates ?"
The Chesapeake & Ohio claimed that it could assume the loss, i.e., the
difference between $1.45 and $.28 (.as a dealer and not as a carrier), and thus
evade the requirement of the statute relating to the conformity to the published
rates. The Court said :22
"In view of the positive command of the second section of the act, that
no departure from the published rate shall be made, 'directly or indirectly,'
how can it in reason be held that a carrier may take itself from out of the
statute in every case by simply electing to be a dealer and transport a
commodity in that character? For, of course, if a carrier has a right to
disregard the published rates by resorting to a particular form of dealing,
it must follow that there is no obligation on the part of a carrier to adhere
to the rates, because doing so is merely voluntary."
The Court, in effect, accepted the contention made in the Brief for the
Interstate Commerce Commission23 "that the law will presume in such a factual
2'200 U. S. 361, 391, 26 Sup. Ct. 272 (1906).
'Records and Briefs, U. S. Supreme Court, vol. 2, Oct. Term 1905, pp. 29-31.
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situation that the resulting loss was sustained by the corporation in a capacity
as carrier and not in its capacity as vendor-shipper; in other words, that the
merchandise was transported for less than the published rates." The Inter-
state Commerce Commission Brief pointed out "that if the law did not raise
this presumption from the facts recited, it would follow either (1) that it must
be left entirely to the carrier to say whether the loss was sustained as carrier,
and hence, whether the goods were transported for less than the published
rates or whether the loss was sustained as vendor-which is to leave it to the
carrier to decide whether it has violated the statute, or, (2) which is only a
shade less absurd, the law must presume that the loss was sustained as
vendor."
The Court said, at page 392:
"The all-embracing prohibition against either directly or indirectly
charging less than the published rates shows that the purpose of the statute
was to make the prohibition applicable to every method of dealing by a
carrier by which the forbidden result could be brought about.... Indeed
the inevitable result of the possession of such a right by a carrier would
be to enable it, if it chose to exercise the power, to concentrate in its own
hands the products which were held for shipment along its line, and to
make it, therefore, the sole purchaser thereof and the sole seller at the
place where the products were to be marketed; in other words, to create
an absolute monopoly."
It is to be noted also that the Court took the position that the statute, without
a Commodities Clause, provided in effect for a divorce of production and trans-
portation where the published rates were departed from in this type of cdse.
On this point the Court said, at page 399:
"It is urged that if the requirement of the act to regulate commerce as
to the maintenance of published rates and the prohibitions of that act
against undue preferences and discriminations be applied to a carrier when
engaged in buying and selling a commodity which it transports, the sub-
stantial effect will be to prohibit the carrier from becoming a dealer when
no such prohibition is expressed in the act to regulate commerce, and
hence a prohibition will be implied which should only result from express
action by Congress. Granting the premise, the deduction is unfounded.
Because no express prohibition against a carrier who engages in inter-
state commerce becoming a dealer in commodities moving in such com-
merce is found in the act, it does not follow that the provisions which are
expressed in that act should not be applied and be given their lawful effect.
Even, therefore, if the resdt of applying the provisions as we have inter-
preted them wrill be practically to render it difficult, if not impossible, for
a carrier to deal in commodities, this affords no ground for relieving
us of the plain duty of enforcing the provisions of the statute as they
exist." (Italics supplied.)
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In the later case of United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co.,24 which
was the first case construing the Commodities Clause, the Court comments on
the New Haven case and corroborates the point that in that type of case the
Interstate Commerce Act meant identically the same thing without the Com-
modities Clause as with it. The Court said, at page 410:
"In that case [New York, New Haven and Hartford R.R. v. Interstate
Commerce Commission, supra] after much consideration, it was held that
the prohibitions of the Interstate Commerce Act as to uniformity of rates
and against rebates operated to prevent a carrier engaged in interstate com-
inerce from buying and selling a commodity which it carried in stch a way
as to frustrate the provisions of the act, even if the effect of applying the
act would be substantially to render buying and selling by an interstate
carrier of a commodity which it transported practically impossible."
(Italics supplied.)
Let us recapitulate the significance of the Nw Haven case in supporting our
thesis that it is possible to divorce production and transportation of petroleum
and its products by litigation under existing statutes.
(1) The New Haven case antedated the Hepburn Act.
(2) The Congressional legislation in' force at the time of the New
Haven decision applied only to rail and rail and water carriers.
(3) The effect of the Pipe Line Amendment to the Hepburn Act
clothed interstate pipe lines with a common carrier status and subjected
them to the same statutory regulations as interstate carriers by rail and
rail and water. (In the Matter of Pipe Lines, The Pipe Line Cases,
supra.)
(4) This common carrier status impressed upon the pipe lines a public
obligation "as a public agent to give equal treatment to all." (New
York, New Haven and Hartford R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, supra).
(5) The Commodities Clause, which constituted the first Congressional
attempt to divorce production and transportation in the railroad field,
was a section of the Hepburn Act.
(6) There was no Commodities Clause involved in the New Haven case
as applied to railroads, and the Congress has refused in the Hepburn
Act and in later legislation to make the Commodities Clause applicable
to oil pipe lines.
(7) The New Haven case dealt with a situation wherein the railroad
was acting in a dual capacity as carrier and as owner (dealer) of the
commodity transported, and wherein the selling price of the commodity
2'213 U. S. 366, 29 Sup. Ct. 527 (1909).
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in question, stipulated in the contract, was not sufficient to pay the cost
of purchase plus the cost of delivery in conformity with the published
freight rates. The Court held that the railroad could not evade the re-
quirements of the statute relating to conformity to the published rates by
assuming the loss as a dealer rather than as a carrier.
(8) The effect of the Pipe Line Amendment as construed in The Pipe
Line Cases is to extend the NeW Haven doctrine to similar situations
wherein the pipe line companies.are acting in a dual capacity as carriers
and as owners (dealers) of the commodities transported. It follows that
in a case wherein the pipe line company acts in the dual capacity of
carrier and dealer and the published rates are departed from, the statute,
in the absence of a Commodities Clause, will be construed in effect so as
to provide for a divorce of production and transportation. (New York,
New Haven and Hartford R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Commission,
United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., supra.)
(9) Under the assumed state of facts, the pipe line companies run afoul
of the statutes by reason of the practice of deviating from the published
transportation tariffs. The New Haven case prohibits the subterfuge of
assuming the losses as dealers rather than as carriers.
(10) If the major oil companies are taking advantage of their relation-
ship with the pipe line carriers so as to dictate the market price at both
ends of the pipe lines and, having thus created an artificial price structure,
are using the pipe line charges as a driving wedge to prevent others from
marketing oil lawfully produced by them either in the field or at the point
of destination, unless it is sold to the major companies at a dictated price,
then under these conditions the doctrine of the New Haven case is ap-
plicable and may be utilized to prevent the further destruction of com-
petition on the part of the independent producers.
(3). The broad mandate of the Elkins Act is to ensure like treatment for all
shippers and every conceivable device that frustrates that mandate is outlawed
by the statute.
The words "rebate" and "device" are not words of art having a precise and
definite legal meaning and the forms of "rebate," "drawback," "concession,"
"discrimination" or "other device" by means of which "an advantage is given
or discrimination is practiced" are so varied that it is impossible to classify
them into distinct types. The result in each case is predicated on the peculiar
facts established therein, which have the purpose and effect of deviating from
the published rate and violating the mandate that all shippers be treated alike.2 5
'Some of the leading cases that have given this broad construction to the Elkins Act
are: Armour Packing Company v. United States, 209 U. S. 56, 28 Sup. Ct. 486 (1908) ;
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In Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Mottley20 the Court characterized the broad
purpose of the Elkins Act "to cut up by the roots every form of discrimina-
tion, favoritism and inequality," and the Interstate Commerce Commission has
declared that it was the purpose of Congress "to strike through all pretense,
all ingenious device, to the substance of the transaction."'27 In United States v.
Hocking Valley R. R.,' 8 the court pointed out that:
"Of course, it is not practicable for Congress to set a limit on human
ingenuity in the devising of schemes obnoxious to the act to regulate com-
merce by attempting a description of all possible methods. The act accom-
plishes its end by directly and unmistakably condemning results, where-
fore every devisable plan to produce the objectionable conditions is under
its ban. Surely our jurisprudence is not so inept and feeble that a statute
exhibiting a definite purpose to meet palpable mischiefs must be construed
so narrowly as to oblige Congress from time to time to amend it that its
provisions may be kept, at the best, only in the immediate rear of a pro-
cession of new methods born of the fertility of human invention and
designed to circumvent that legislative will which it attempts by each
amplifying amendment to express."
In Chicago & Alton R. R. v. United States,29 the court said that "under the
Elkins Act the standard of comparison is the published rate. It is only neces-
sary to prove that the favored shipper has had his property transported at a
less rate than that published and filed." In Vandalia R. R. v. United States,30
the court stressed the "subtle disguises" under which rebates have been en-
joyed. "That the full tariff rate is collected at the time of transportation does
not negative the possibility of a rebate in respect thereto. The rebate may be
in a lump cash sum in advance (United States v. Union Stockyards, 226 U.
S. 286, 33 S. Ct. 83, 57 L. Ed. 226) or by later or earlier indirect payments
(G. R. & I. Ry. Co. v. United States, 212 Fed. 577, 129 C. C. A. 113)." In
Armour Packing Company v. United States,31 the Court gave a liberal inter-
pretation of the word "device," saying:
"And we find the word device disassociated from any such words as
fraudulent conduct, scheme or contrivance, but the act seems to reach all
United States v. Union Stockyards, 226 U. S. 286, 33 Sup. Ct. 83 (1912) ; United States v.
Michigan Portland Cement Co., 270 U. S. 521, 46 Sup. Ct. 395 (1926); and see American
Express Co. v. United States, 212 U. S. 522, 29 Sup. Ct. 315 (1909); United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 148 Fed. 719 (N. D. Ill. 1907).
'219 U. S. 467, 31 Sup. Ct. 265 (1911).
'Association of Bituminous Operators of Central Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania R. R.,
10 I. C. C. 385, 402 (1904).
m194 Fed. 234, 251 (N. D. Ohio 1911), aff'd, 210 Fed. 735 (C. C. A. 6th 1914), cert.
denied, 234 U. S. 757, 34 Sup. Ct. 675 (1914).
:156 Fed. 558, 562 (C. C. A. 7th 1907), aff'g, 148 Fed. 646 (N. D. Ill. 1906), aff'd
w.o.op. by divided court, 212 U. S. 563, 29 Sup. Ct. 689 (1908).
'226 Fed. 713, 716 (C. C. A. 7th 1915).
'209 U. S. 56, 71, 28 Sup. Ct. 428 (1907).
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means and methods by which the unlawful preference of rebate, con-
cession or discrimination is offered, granted, given or received. . . .A
device need not be necessarily fraudulent; the term includes anything
which is a plan or contrivance."
(4). Devices, although legal per se, are outlawed when they constitute
integral parts of a plan that violates the statute.
We have seen how the New Haven case establishes the proposition that a
carrier may not evade the prohibitions against rebating by becoming a dealer
in a commodity which it transports, even though there is no express statutory
prohibition against this sort of dealer-shipper relationship as such. So the
legality of the following ingenious devices, considered separately, is unques-
tioned: (a) Stock ownership of the pipe line company by the major oil pro-
ducing companies, (b) with its alleged insulation of liability by virtue of the
creation of a separate corporate entity and (c) the right of the directors of the
pipe line company to declare dividends out of profits. But when the devices of
stock ownership, corporate entity and the "kick-back" in the form of dividends
are parts of a plan whereby the owner of the pipe lines is permitted to ship at
cost, while all others must pay the published transportation rate, then we have
a continuing violation of the "rebate-device" sections of the Elkins Act which
is inherent in the very nature of the pipe line set-up.
That this ingenious scheme is not entirely novel is established by several
cases. In Colonial Salt Company v. Michigan, Indiana and Illinois Line,82 a
boat line, incorporated as a common carrier, was owned and operated in the
interest of a salt company; it published no rates except upon salt in cargo lots,
and it used as terminal facilities the docks and warehouses of the salt company
by whose, agents and employees all shipments had to be handled. It was held
that the boat line was a mere device to defraud the law, and payments made
to it by connecting rail carriers in the guise of divisions were rebates.
An examination of findings of the interstate Commerce Commission in the
Colonial Salt case establishes a striking similarity between that case and the
case of the pipe lines controlled by the major oil companies. Harlan, Com-
missioner, pointed out (1) the relatively small amount of money originally
invested in the boat line, (2) the tremendous profits accruing from its opera-
tion, (3) that the, boat line and its dock facilities were the private facilities of
the Salt Company that owned the boat line and were not public facilities, (4)
that the general offices of the boat line were also the general offices of the
Salt Company, and (5) that the Salt Company and the boat line constituted
one investment in the same general interest. Commenting on the above
analysis, Harlan, Commissioner, at page 363, said:
-23 I. C. C. 358 (1912).
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"It is clear from this statement of facts that by turning its facilities
over to an incorporated transportation company which handles sub-
stantially nothing but its own salt, the salt company has received extra-
ordinary returns, which give it extraordinary advantages over its coin-
petitors. The situation resolves itself into another of the growing number
of instances where a large industry, by the mere taking out of a charter
under the loose laws of some state, gives to its private facilities the appear-
ance of being a public carrier and then uses them as a device under the
guise of which it may receive and complaisant railroad companies may
pay, rebates to the industry, and also as a club by means of which hesi-
tating and reluctant lines may be forced into the same unlawful relation
with the industry under the threat of a large traffic that may be lost by
their refusal to meet its demands." (Italics supplied.)
In the Matter of Division of Joint Rates to Terminal Railroads,33 it was
shown that the International Harvester Company owned the Illinois Northern
Railroad and that connecting lines paid an exorbitant charge to the railroad
for switching service. The Commission said, at page 401:
"It is urged that all this is simply an arrangement between two con-
necting railroads; that there is no negotiation with the shipper, and no
payment to the shipper. This is a mere play upon words. The Illinois
Northern Railroad Company and the International Harvester Company
are one and the same thing. It is entirely immaterial whether this money
goes in the first instance into the treasury of the International Harvester
Company or that of its creature, the Illinois Northern Railroad Company.
That subterfuges of this sort cannot avail has been often decided, and was
affirmed within the year by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Interstate Comnerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 49 L. ed. 860,
24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 563, in which it was held that it made no difference
whether certain contracts were entered into with a railroad company itself
or with a coal company the stock of which was entirely owned by the rail-
road company." (Italics supplied.)
In Freight Forwarding Investigatio, 3 4 the Interstate Commerce Commission
held that:
-10 I. C. C. 385 (1904).
'229 I. C. C. 201, 293 (1938). Other cases wherein an unsuccessful attempt has been
made by the defendant to utilize the corporate entity theory to evade the prohibitions of a
statute are: The Commodities Clause, U. S. v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 220 U. S. 257, 31
Sup. Ct. 387 (1910) ; U. S. v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western R. R., 238 U. S. 516,
35 Sup. Ct. 873 (1914.) ; U. S. v. Reading Co., 253 U. S. Z6, 40 Sup. Ct. 425 (1919) ; The
Elkins Act, U. S. v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247 (C. C. Wis. 1905) ;
U. S. v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. R. R., 234 Fed. 178 (N. D. II1. 1915); The Interstate
Commerce Act, In The Matter of Alleged Unlawful Rates of the Chicago Great Western
and Other Railroads. 7 I. C. C. 33 (1897). Other leading cases for disregarding the
corporate entity are Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. I. C. C., 219 U. S. 498, 31 Sup. Ct.
279 (1910) ; C. M. & St. P. R. R. v. Minneapolis Civic Ass'n, 247 U. S. 490, 38 Sup.
Ct. 553 (1917); Electric Bond & Share Co. v. S. E. C., 303 U. S. 419, 58 Sup. Ct.
678 (1938).
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"There can be no doubt but that the object of the New York Central in
acquiring stock control of the Universal was to use the latter to serve the
purposes of the former as a forwarder, and this record is convincing that
that purpose has been and is being carried out to the point where the
Universal must be regarded as a mere instrumentality or department of
the New York Central. Obiiously, a common carrier by railroad may not
be permitted to establish a separate corporation for the purpose of grant-
ing concessions or discriminations or of granting rebates from the lauful
tariff rates, all of which would be in derogation of the statute if practiced
by the carrier in its own name." (Italics supplied.)
(5) The scope of injunctive relief under the Interstate Commerce Act.
The possibility of divorcement through the exercise of the equity powers
of the court will be discussed in greater detail in the portion of this study
dealing with the Sherman Act. However, it should be noted that in the New
Haven case under the Interstate Commerce Act (a) the Chesapeake and
Ohio was perpetually enjoined "from taking less than the rates fixed in the
published tariff of freight rates, by means of dealing in the purchase and sale
of coal"; (b) the Court emphasized one of the weaknesses of divorcement
by litigation as contrasted with divorcement by legislation when it denied the
contention "that whenever a carrier has been adjudged to have violated the
Act to regulate commerce in any particular it is the duty of the court, not
only to enjoin the carrier from further like violations of the act, but to com-
mand it in general terms not to violate the act in the future in any particular";
and (c) the Court took the position that on the question of the scope of equity
powers, a Sherman Act case [Swift and Company v. United States, 196 U. S.
375, 25 Sup. Ct. 276 (1905)] could be relied on as a precedent in a case
under the Interstate Commerce Act.
B. THE SHERMAN- ACT AS A BASIS FOR LITIGATION
(1) The pertinent sections of the Sherman Act to be utilized as a basis
for litigation are Section 2 and Section 4.
Section 2 reads as follows:
"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $5,000, or by imprison-
ment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discre-
tion of the court." (Italics supplied.)
Section 4 reads as follows:
"The several district courts of the United States are invested with
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jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of sections 1 to 7 ... and
it shall be the duty of the several district attorneys of the United States,
in their respective districts, under the direction of the Attorney-General,
to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations."
(Italics supplied.)
(2) The second section is broader than the first, for it inhibits monopoly
accomplished by some other means than the particular restraints named in the
first secticn, to wit, "contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . ." Chief Justice White
speaking for the Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, held that the
second section was "inteirded to supplement the first and to make sure that by
no possible guise could the public policy embodied in the first section be frus-
trated or evaded."- In developing this point, he said:
"Undoubtedly, the words 'to monopolize' and 'monopolize' as used in
the section reach every act bringing about the prohibited results ...
In other words, having by the first section forbidden all means of monop-
olizing trade, that is, unduly restraining it by means of every contract,
combination, etc., the second section seeks, if possible, to make the pro-
hibitions of the act all the more complete and perfect by embracing all
attempts to reach the end prohibited by the first section, that is, restraints
of trade, by any attempt to monopolize or monopolization thereof, even al-
though the acts by which such results are attempted to be brought about
or are brought about be not embraced within the general enumeration of
the first section." (Italics supplied.)
(3) Under the assumed state of facts, the major oil companies through
their domination of the pipe line companies, are controlling the transportation
of oil in the areas served by their lines and are "monopolizing" or "attempting
to monopolize" the prdduction and distribution of oil in violation of Section 2
of the Sherman Act.
(a) The essential elements constituting monopoly.
the idea of monopoly is not now confined to a grant of privileges.
It is understood to include a 'condition produced by the acts of mere
individuals. Its dominant thought now is . . .- 'the motive of exclusive-
ness or unity'; in other words, the suppression of competition by the uni-
fication of interest or management, or it may be through agreement and
concert of action."3 6
"A monopoly of trade embraces two essential elements: (1) The
acquisition of an exclusive right to, or the exclusive control of, that trade;
and (2) the exclusion of all others from that right and control."3 7
21 U. S. 1, 61, 62, 31 Sup. Ct. 502 (1911). (Italics supplied.)
'National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U. S..115, 129, 25 Sup. Ct. 379 (1904).
'United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 58 Fed. 58, 82 (C. C. A. 8th
1893).
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(b) Section 2 outlaws the monopolization or attempt to monopolize "any
part" of the trade or commerce among the several states.
In Standard Oil Co. v. United States3 8 the Court said: "The commerce
referred to by the words 'any part' construed in the light of the mani-
fest purpose of the statute has both a geographical and a distributive sig-
nificance, that is, it includes any portion the United States and any one of the
classes of things forming a part of interstate or foreign commerce."
In O'Halloran vi. American Sea Green Slate Co.,39 the court said:
[To constitute a violation of the statute] it is not necessary to
show that a complete and United States wide monopoly has been actually
created, or that the entire trade or business and production of an article
has been brought within the control of the combination, or ever will be.
It is no defense for such a combination to show that there is still some
competition and some competitors, and that the acts of the combination
do not wholly and entirely control interstate commerce in the article, or
absolutely fetter it. If the combination be one in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several states to any substantial degree, it is within the
condemnation of the statute."
In United States v. E. C. Knight Co.,40 the Court said:
".... all the authorities agree that in order to vitiate a contract or com-
bination it is not essential that its result should be a complete monopoly;
it is sufficient if it really tends to that end and to deprive the public of the
advantages which flow from free competition."
(c) The process of integration as practiced by the major oil companies
contains the germ of monopoly and is not a "normal method of industrial
development" which would be permitted by the Sherman Act.
The fusion of the functions of production, transportation, refining and
marketing of petroleum and its products in each of the major oil companies
is inherently monopolistic and the resulting concentration and control consti-
tutes a potential weapon for fostering further restraints on trade and com-
merce in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The old Standard Oil
Company, which was dissolved in 1911,41 had only carried the process of
integration into the fields of transportation, refining and marketing. Today
the twenty-two major oil companies, which transact more than 85% of
the total business of the industry (with the exception of the Standard Oil
Company of Kentucky, which is a marketing set-up), have extended the process
of integration into all four branches of the industry.4
'221 U. S. 1, 61, 31 Sup. Ct. 502 (1911).
'207 Fed. 187, 191 (N. D. N. Y. 1913).
'°156 U. S. 1, 16, 15 Sup. Ct. 249 (1895).
aStandard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 31 Sup. Ct. 402 (1911).
'This fact was brought to light in the hearings before the Temporary National
Economic Committee which report now appears only in mimeographed form.
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However, the control of the pipe line, or transportation branch, is the
ultimate keystone in the arch of monopoly. The unusual susceptibility of the
petroleum industry to monopolistic mastery lies in the fact that control of
refineries means control of the entire industry, for the fundamental reason
that crude petroleum has no consumer value43 and refining is controlled
udtimately by the control of transportation facilities. John D. Rockefeller, Sr.
recognized this fact and acquired this control of refining through railroad
rebates. By this device, in the decade from 1867 to 1877 he increased his
control of the iefining business from 10% to 907 of the entire industry.
Since railroad rebates have been outlawed, the new device to obtain this
control is the pipe line.44 Today the twenty-two major oil companies control
85% of the crude pipe line mileage and seventeen of these companies control
96% of the gasoline pipe line mileage.45
Although the Sherman Act does not prohibit a "normal case of integration
of industry"4 6 or a "normal method of industrial development," 47 it does forbid
a practice whereby the pipe line companies controlled by the major oil produc-
ing companies are virtually the sole purchasers and sellers of all oil produced
in the area which they serve.
The Supreme Court, in upholding a decree which dissolved, under the
Sherman Act, the holding company in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
emphasized in the following words the distinction between "normal methods
of industrial development" (which were permitted by the statute) and "new
means of combination" which made for monopoly :48
"Because the unification of power and control over petroleum and its
products which was the inevitable result of the combining in the New
Jersey corporation by the increase of its stock and the transfer to it of
the stocks of so many other corporations, aggregating so vast a capital,
gives rise, in and of itself, in the absence of countervailing circumstances,
to say the least, to the prima facie presumption of intent and purpose
to maintain the dominancy over the oil industry, not as a result of normal
'methods of industrial development, but by new means of combination
which were resorted to in order that greater power might be added than
would otherwise have arisen had normal methods been followed, the whole
with the purpose of excluding others from the trade and thus centralizing
in the combination a perpetual control of the movements of petroleum and
'Kemnitzer, The Monopoly Problem in the Petroleum Industry of the United States(an address delivered Oct. 25, 1938, at the Morrison Hotel, Chicago, Illinois, before the
National Oil Marketers Association. The thesis is developed more in detail in his book,
THE REBIRTH OF MONOPOLY [1938]).
"TARBELL, THE HisTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (1904) cc. 3, 5.
'These estimates have been prepared by the Department of Justice based largely on
Interstate Commerce Commission reports.
"United States v. Winslow, 22 T. S. 202, 33 Sup. Ct. 253 (1913).
'United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 505, 507, 19 Sup. Ct. 25 (1898).
"221 U. S. 1, 75, 31 Sup. Ct. 502 (1911).
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its products in the channels of interstate commerce." (Italics supplied.)
(d) The major oil companies, through their control of the pipe lines are
utilizing a technique in which the latter instrumentality places them in "a dual
and inconsistent position of public carrier and private shipper."
The characterization of "a dual and inconsistent position of public carrier
and private shipper" was first used by the courts in the anthracite-railroad
cases.49 In the New Haven case the Court characterized the coal company-
railroads as a set-up in which the railroads became "virtually the sole pur-
chasers and sellers of all the coal produced along the line of its road." The
analogy between the anthracite-railroads and the major oil-controlled pipe lines
is emphasized by the characterization of Mr. Justice Holmes in The Pipe Line
Cases. Although the Court in these cases held that the pipe lines were common
carriers in law, it pointed out that in fact the uniform practice of the major
pipe line companies has been to carry "all oil offered, if only the offerers will
sell at their price."
In United States v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western R. R. 50 the Court
said, "The Commodities Clause of the Hepburn Act was intended to prevent
railroads from occupying the dual and inconsistent positions of public carrier
and private shipper." It is true that the Commodities Clause does not apply
to pipe lines, but we have shown that the doctrine of the New Haven case,
which antedated the Hepburn Act, has been extended by virtue of the Pipe
Line Amendment of the Hepburn Act so as to be applicable to pipe lines, and
the Supreme Court in the Delaware & Hudson case has intimated that the
effect of the New Haven doctrine was to hold that the Interstate Commerce
Act meant the same thing without the Commodities Clause as with it.
(e) This dual and inconsistent position of public carrier and private shipper
leads inevitably (1) to the imposition of excessive rates and (2) these excessive
rates are used as a weapon of monopoly.
This charge is not a theoretical one, but is substantiated by the practices of
the anthracite coal-railroads and the major oil companies' controlled pipe
lines. Tie best evidence that pipe line rates are excessive, is the well-
recognized fact in the oil industry that over the years deficits in the divisions
of production, refining or marketing have been liquidated by profits in the pipe
line division. From 1927 to 1934, the pipe line division of the major oil
companies, having only 7.1% of the industry's investment, produced 86%
of the industry's total net profit.51
"United States v. Reading Co., 226 U. S. 324, 340, 341, 33 Sup. Ct. 90 (1912).
238 U. S. 516, 525, 35 Sup. Ct. 873 (1915) (Italics supplied.) ; see also D. L. & W.
R. R. v. United States, 231 U. S. 363, 370, 34 Sup. Ct. 65 (1913).
'Ryan, Can Marketing Produce More Profits? WoRLn PETRO.EUM& (Dec. 1937) 26.
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The long struggle between the independent shippers and the anthracite-
railroads over freight rates was discussed at length by Mr. Justice Lurton
in the first Reading case. The effect of excessive rates in the building up of
the railroad coal companies was stated as follows :52
" ...obviously, buyer and seller were not upon an equal plane. The
former had control of freight rates and car service. The seller must pay
the rate exacted and accept the car service supplied him by the buyer, or
appeal to the remedies afforded by the law. If the rate of freight to
tide-water was onerous and was imposed upon the coal produced by the
defendants and their allied coal producers without discrimination against
the coal of the independent shipper, it would nevertheless bear upon the
latter oppressively, since the rate paid would find its way into the pocket
of the defendants. Therefore it was that the higher the freight rate, the
greater the inducement to sell to the carrier companies." (Italics supplied.)
In the Anthracite Rate Case the Interstate Commerce Commission held :3
"[The rates] were established at an excessive basis, and clearly it was
so done for the purpose of eliminating the independent output as a factor
of competition in the markets with the railroad interest's output ...
Reviewing this whole series of transactions they seem merely parts of a
plan to publish in tariff form rates which were excessive and which pre-
sented a barrier against successful shipping by the small shipper, the
independent operator, and then, by methods which in effect were secret,
to reduce those published rates on the shipments of the coal company that
had railroad affiliations."
In this connection, the declaration of Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the
Court in Swift and Company v. United States, should not be forgotten: "It
is obvious that no more powerfd instrument of monopoly could be used than
an advantage in the cost of transportation."54
(f) The contentions, if established, that the oil companies, through their
control of the pipe lines (1) have had no evil intent and (2) have not thereby
raised the price of the product are not valid to escape the prohibitions of the
statute.
The law is firmly settled that while a bad intent may render acts otherwise
innocent illegal, a good intent can never afford legal justification for doing
that which is prohibited. "If the necessary result is materially to restrain
trade between the states, the intent with which the thing was done is of no
consequence." 55  "It is too late in the day to assert against statutes which
Investment in production was 42.7%; in marketing 22.6% and in refining 27.6%. These
figures are based on the cost studies of the United States Tariff Commission and of the
Petroleum Administrative Board.
'United States v. Reading Co., 226 U. S. 324, 359, 33 Sup. Ct 90 (1912).
"35 I. C. C. 220, 232, 242 (1915).
-196 U. S. 375, 402, 25 Sup. Ct. 276 (1905). (Italics supplied.)
"United States v. Reading Co., 226 U. S. 324, 370, 33 Sup. Ct. 90 (1912).
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forbid combinations of competing companies that a particular combination was
induced by good intentions and has had some good effect."50
Specifically, the failure to raise prices, or even a lowering of prices, cannot
justify a restraint or monopolization of trade. On this point the Court in
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Associationi7 said, "In this light
it is not material that the price of an article may be lowered. It is in the
power of the combination to raise it ......
(4) Under the assumed state of facts, the most apposite decision that
would tend to show that the major oil companies through their control of the
pipe lines are violating Sections 2 and 4 of the Sherman Act is United States
v. Lehigh Valley R. R. 8 In this case the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company,
in combination with the Lehigh Valley Coal Company, a subsidiary created
and operated as a mere agency or instrumentality of the Railroad Company,
deliberately entered upon the policy of purchasing and leasing the anthracite
coal lands in Pennsylvania tributary to its extensive railroad system, and of
buying up the stocks of corporations owning such lands, for the purpose of
controlling the mining, transportation and sale of the coal to be obtained
therefrom and of preventing and suppressing competition, especially in the
transportation and sale of such coal in interstate commerce. Mr. Justice
Clarke said, at page 269:
"... . this policy was continued after the passage of the Anti-Trust Act
with increasing energy and tenacity of purpose, with the result that a
practical monopoly was attained of the transportation and sale of anthra-
cite coal derived from such lands.
"The area of the anthracite territory is so restricted that to thus obtain
control of the supply of such coal on a great system of railway (the
amount transported exceeded one-fifth of the entire production of the
country for the year before this suit was commenced) by a combination of
corporations, such as we have here, and by such methods as we have seen
were employed, effected a restraint of trade or commerce among the sev-
eral States and constituted an attempt to monopolize and an actual
monopolization of a part of such trade or commerce in anthracite coal,
clearly within the meaning of the first and second sections of the Anti-
Trust Act as they have frequently been interpreted by this court." (Italics
supplied.)
(5) The scope of injunctive relief under Section 4 of the Sherman Act.
(a) The decree should be broad enough to make it effective.
In Northern Securities Co. v. United States,59 Mr. Justice Harlan said:
'International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199, 209, 34 Sup. Ct. 859 (1914).
166 U. S. 290, 324, 17 Sup. Ct. 540 (1897) ; see also United States v. Joint Traffic
Association, 171 U. S. 505, 19 Sup. Ct. 25 (1898).
'254 U. S. 255, 41 Sup. Ct. 104 (1920).
'193 U. S. 197, 344, 24 Sup. Ct. 436 (1903).
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"All will agree that if the Anti-Trust Act be constitutional, and if the
combination in question be in violation of its provisions, the courts may
enforce the provisions of the statute by such orders and decrees as are
necessary or appropriate to that end and as may be consistent with the
fundamental rules of legal procedure."
Mr. Justice Holmes, in Swift and Company v. United States,60 warned that
"'we . . . are bound by the first principles of justice not to sanction a decree
so vague as to put the whole conduct of the defendant's business at the peril
of a summons for contempt. We cannot issue a general injunction against
all possible breaches of the law." But on the other hand he pointed out that
"a bill in equity is not to be read and construed as an indictment would have
been read and construed a hundred years ago, but it is to be taken to mean
what it fairly conveys to a dispassionate reader by a fairly exact use of
English speech. Thus read this bill seems to us intended to allege successive
elements of a single connected scheme. * * * The defendants cannot be
ordered to compete, but they properly can be forbidden to give directions or
to make agreements not to compete."
(b) The distinction between the scope of injunctive relief (1) in the case of
a simple violation of the statute and (2) the creation of a condition which is not
only a continued attempt to monwpolize, but also a monopolization in violation
of the statute.
Ordinarily, where it is found that acts have been done in violation of the
statute, an injunction restraining such acts in the future will be an adequate
means of relief. However, this may not afford adequate relief. Thus, in
Standard Oil Co. v. United States6 1 the Supreme Court said:
"But in a case like this, where the condition which has been brought
about in violation of the statute, in and of itself, is not only a continued
attempt to monopolize, but also a monopolization the duty to enforce the
statute requires the application of broader and more controlling remedies.
As penalties which are not authorized by law may not be inflicted by
judicial authority, it follows that to meet the situation with which we are
confronted the application of remedies two-fold in character becomes
essential: 1st. To forbid the doing in the future of acts like those which
we have found to have been done in the past which would be violative
of the statute. 2nd. The exertion of such measure of relief as will
effectually dissolve the combination found to exist in violation of the
statute, and thus neutralize the extension and continually operating force
which the possession of the power unlawfully obtained has brought and
will continue to bring about." (Italics supplied.)
-"196 U. S. 375, 396, 395, 400, 25 Sup. Ct. 276 (1905).
'221 U. S. 1, 77, 78, 31 Sup. Ct. 502 (1911).
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(c) Where there is a continuing monopolization in violation of the statute,
dissolution of the illegal combination is a proper injunctive remedy.
In the case of Northern Securities Co. v. United States,62 Mr. Justice
Harlan, speaking for the Court said, "This it must be remembered is a suit in
equity, instituted by authority of Congress 'to prevent and restrain violations
of the act' (sec. 4) ; and the court in virtue of a well settled rule governing
proceedings in equity, may mould its decree so as to accomplish practical
results, such results as law and justice demand." It will be noted that in the
Northern Securities case, the Court did not stop with enjoining the Securities
Company from voting the shares of one of the two railroads, but enjoined it
from voting the shares of both, thereby completely dissolving the combination.
In United States v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours Co., Judge Lanning, after
referring to the remedies adopted in the Standard Oil case, said, "Both of these
remedies are as clearly demanded in the present case as they were in the
Standard Oil Case. The existing combination in the explosives trade is one
in restraint of interstate commerce .... It has also attempted to monopolize,
and has monopolized, and is now in the possession of a monopoly of a large
part of the explosives trade in the United States. Our decree must therefore
be one which will forbid future acts violative of the law and compel a dissolu-
tion of the combination existing in violation of the law."63
In United States v. American Tobacco Co.,64 the nature of the relief to be
granted was again given consideration, and it was there concluded that the
only effectual remedy was to dissolve the combination and the companies com-
prising it, and for that purpose the cause was remanded to the District Court
to hear the parties and determine a method of dissolution and of recreating
from the elements composing it "a new condition which shall be honestly in
harmony with and not repugnant to the law."
The most succinct statement of the dissolution doctrine, which if applied
to the oil companies would mean a divorcement of the production and trans-
portation activities of that industry, is found in the case of United States v.
United States Steel Corporation :65
"It scarcely need be again said by us that where the evil effects of past
undue restraint or monopoly continue to be effective and harmful when
the proceeding is begun-that is, where 'the inherent nature of the con-
templated acts' is such as to bring about their continuance and repetition,
or where, to use the expressive language of the Supreme Court in the
Standard Oil Case, a 'perennial violation' of the act exists-the juris-
diction to restrain present and prevent future violations vests under this
-193 U. S. 197, 360, 24 Sup. Ct. 436 (1904).
'188 Fed. 127, 154 (C. C. Del. 1911). (Italics supplied.)6221 U. S. 106, 31 Sup. Ct. 632 (1911).
6223 Fed. 55, 59 (D. N. J. 1915), aff'd, 251 U. S. 417, 40 Sup. Ct. 293 (1920).
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section, and if, to prevent continuance of such continuing wrongs a
dissolution of the unlawful combination is necessary to make the relief
effective, the original combination will be dissolved." (Italics supplied.)
II. DIVORCEMENT BY LEGISLATION,
Judge Learned Hand has pointed out that legislation is to be preferred to
litigation (under existing statutes) as an instrumentality for divorcement for
the reason that the former "will obviate the difficulty of detecting actual
offenders [who are departing from the published rates in cases where the
facts are peculiarly within the carrier's knowledge and the differential
between cost and sales price, which would cover transportation cost, is a
mere matter of bookkeeping] by prohibiting a kind of business in which
offenses are most likely to arise."66 However, if an effective legislative
divorcement of the production and the transportation aspects of the oil
industry is to be achieved, it is our thesis that that consummation cannot be
reached by what might appear to be the obvious method of, amending the
Commodities Clause of the Hepburn Act and inserting therein the words
"tpipe line carriers." In a series of veering interpretations6 7 of the Com-
modities Clause (which is limited to railroads), the Supreme Court of the
United States has whittled away its efficacy as an instrumentality of divorce-
ment. In the latest case in the series,68 Mr. Justice Stone, in a powerful
dissent concurred in by Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Cardozo, said:
"If the Commodities Clause permits control such as is exhibited here,
one is at a loss to say what scope remains for the operation of the
statute. Whatever views may be entertained of the soundness and wisdom
of the decision in United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co. [which
was the first case construing the clause] it neither requires nor excuses
our reduction of the Commodities Clause to a cipher in the calculations
of those who control the railroads of the country."
Based on a review of the Commodities Clause cases, the legal staff of the
Interstate Commerce Commission has reached the conclusion that the Com-
modities Clause. "falls far short of really divorcing transportation from
production," in the following respects :69
'Hand, The Commodities Clause and the Fifth Amendment (1909) 22 HARv. L. REv.
250, 254.
'United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 29 Sup. Ct. 527 (1908);
United States v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 220 U. S. 257, 31 Sup. Ct. 387 (1911) ; United
States v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western R. R., 238 U. S. 516, 35 Sup. Ct. 873(1914) ; United States v. Reading Co., 253 U. S. 26, 40 Sup. Ct. 425 (1919) ; United States
v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry., 298 U. S. 492, 56 Sup. Ct. 841 (1935).
*'United States v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry., 298 U. S. 492, 512, 56 Sup. Ct. 841 (1935),
criticized (1937) 22 CORNELL L. Q. 427.
=Confidential memorandum of J. Stanley Payne, Assistant Chief Counsel, Interstate
Commerce Commission, addressed to Chief Counsel, March 12, 1937, p. 19.
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(a) "The Commodities Clause does not necessarily prevent a rail-
road company from holding some or even all of the stock of a manufactur-
ing, mining, or producing company.
(b) "The Commodities Clause does not necessarily prevent a railroad
company from transporting articles or commodities manufactured, mined,
or produced by a company some or all of the stock of which is owned by
the railroad company.
(c) "The Commodities Clause does not necessarily prevent a railroad
company from owning and operating coal mines or other manufacturing,
mining or producing companies.
(d) "The Commodities Clause does not prevent a holding company
from owning some or all of the stock of a railroad company and also some
or all of the stock of a producing company which ships over the subsidiary
railroad company, so long as the holding company refrains from going
too far in the exercise of its control over the railroad company."
The vice of the Commodities Clause lies not in any lack of constitutional
power but in its particular phraseology.70 Starting in 1909, at least ten
annual reports of the Attorney General of the United States71 have criticized
in no uncertain terms the shortcomings and the "illusory prohibitions" of the
Commodities Clause. However, the late Senator Borah, until the last
Congress, was a convert to the belief that effective divorcement of the'
transportation and production aspects of the petroleum industry could be
obtained by merely amending the Commodities Clause and inserting therein
the words "pipe line carriers," and he introduced several bills72 to that
effect. The author of this article, acting as legal advisor to the special sub-
committee of the Senate Judiciary Committee in conjunction with Mr. Paul
E. Hadlick, Secretary and Counsel of the National Oil Marketers Association,
caused Senator Borah to abandon the attempt to amend the Commodities
Clause, with the result that the Borah-Gillette bill introduced in the Senate of
the United States on April 17, 193973 has "teeth" in it and is substantially
identical with the long-forgotten Adamson Bill74 introduced into the House
of Representatives in 1917.
It is believed that the Borah-Gillette Bill will avoid the loopholes that have
developed in the interpretation of the Commodities Clause of the Hepburn Act
and will, if enacted, bring about a more effective divorcement in the oil industry
'The following authorities discuss the deficiencies in the phraseology of the Com-
modities Clause and point out its weakness: RIPLEY, RAILROADS; FINANCE AND ORGANIZA-
TION (1923) 453; KIBLER, THE COMM, ODITIES CLAUSE (1916) 137; Hand, The Coin-
modities Clause and the Fifth Amendment (1909) 22 HARV. L. REv. 250, 264; The Com-
inodities Clause Decision (1909) 9 COL. L. REv. 522, 533.
7'REPs. Arr' GEN. (1909) 4; (1910) 7; (1911) 14, 15; (1912) 23-24; (1913) 25-26;
(1914) 5-6: (1915) 7-8; (1916) 7-8; (1917) 7-8; (1927) 26, 27.
'S. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., Jan. 10, 1935; S. 1398, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 8, 1937.
"S. 2181, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).7 4H. R. 20470, 63d Cong., 3d Sess. (1917). This bill applied to railroads only.
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than was ever accomplished by the former act in the railroad field. The
Borah-Gillette Bill covers four factual situations: it makes it unlawful for
an interstate pipe line common-carrier to transport any petroleum or the
products thereof (a) produced, purchased, manufactured or refined; or (b)
the control of which, or any interest in which, direct or indirect, shall have been
thereafter acquired in any manner for the purpose of dealing therein; or
(c) as to which there is at the time of transportation any contract, option, or
understanding for the subsequent acquisition of control thereof or of any
interest therein, direct or indirect; or (d) from lands which at the time of
production were owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, wholly or in part;
and all of these four factual situations are subject to the following four
controls: (a) by such common-carrier; (b) by any person, firm or corporation
subject to its control; (c) by any person, firm or corporation to whose control
it is subject through stock ownership or otherwise; and (d) by any corporation
or association which has the same controlling shareholders or members or that
otherwise is subject to the same control. A further safeguard is found in the
definition of the term "control" which means "actual or legal power or
influence over another person, whether direct or indirect, arising through direct
or indirect ownership of capital stock, interlocking directorates or officers,
contractual relations, agency agreements, or leasing arrangements."
(1) The Borah-Gillette Bill will plug the loopholes in the Commodities Clause
exposed by the case of United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co.75
The Attorney General of the United States in his report for 190976 pointed
out the loopholes in the Delaware & Hudson case in the following words:
"The court, while upholding the right of Congress in the exercise of its
constitutional power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, to
absolutely prohibit a railroad company engaged in interstate commerce
from carrying in competition with other shippers commodities in which
it is personally interested at the time of such transportation, nevertheless
decided that this prohibition did not apply to the transportation of com-
modities owned by another corporation, where the only interest which the
carrier had therein at the time of such transportation arises out of its
ownership of capital stock in the corporation owning the commodities so
transported. The decision does not necessarily determine the application
of the statute to cases where the commodities transported are owned by a
corporation, all, or substantially all, of whose stock is owned by the carrier
corporation at the time of transportation, and especially where the carrier
shall have transferred all of its interest in such commodities to a corpora-
tion formed for the express purpose of evading the prohibition of the
Commodities Clause, and all or substantially all of the stock in which is
owned by the carrier."
'213 U. S. 366, 29 Sup. Ct. 527 (1908).
7 Pp. 3, 4.
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(2) The Borah-Gillette Bill will plug the loopholes in the Commodities Clause
exposed by the case of United States v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western
R. R.77
The Attorney General of the United States, in his report for 1917, said :78
"I stated in a previous report that even should the government be
successful in this case [the Lackawanna case] in the Supreme Court, the
commodities clause would still fall short of accomplishing its purpose-the
divorce of transportation from production. This is not less evident now
that the case has, in fact, been determined in favor of the government,
since railroads are still able to claim that the clause does not prohibit
them from engaging in production along their lines, provided only that
they sell the articles produced before transporting them.
"I therefore urge an amendment which will prohibit a railroad from
transporting in interstate commerce articles which it manufactured or
produced, or which were manufactured or produced by any corporation
controlled by it or affiliated with it by having the same controlling stock-
holders, irrespective of whether such railroad or such controlled or
affiliated corporation has an interest in the articles at the time of trans-
portation. It is also necessary, if transportation and production are to be
completely divorced, that Congress prohibit any railroad owned or con-
trolled by a producing or trading corporation, and not operated merely as a
plant facility, from transporting in interstate commerce articles produced
or owned by such corporation.
"A bill to carry out this recommendation was introduced in the Sixty-
third Congress, third session, by the Chairman of the House Committee
on Interstate Commerce (H. R. 20470)." 79 (Italics supplied.)
(3) The Borah-Gillette Bill will plug the loopholes in the Commodities Clause
exposed by the case of United States v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. 0
In this case although the Court found that the United States Steel Corpora-
tion owned all the shares of the Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway and all the
shares of the Illinois Steel Company and of the other subsidiary companies
which ship over the Elgin, Joliet & Eastern, and thus had the power to control
both the railroad and the shipper corporations, it nevertheless held that the
instances of the exercise of the control were not adequate to support the claim
that the Elgin, Joliet & Eastern must be regarded as the alter ego of its sole
stockholder, and that there was no violation of the Commodities Clause. The
court distinguished the Reading case upon which the government relied, and
reverted to its earlier decisions in the Delaware & Hudson and Lackawanna
cases to the effect that "the mere power of control, the possibility of initiating
unlawful conditions, is not enough."
'238 U. S. 516, 35 Sup. Ct. 873 (1915).
73P. 8.
'The Borah-Gillette pipe line bill is identical with H. R. 20407, supra note 74, which
applied to railroads only.
60298 U. S. 492, 56 Sup. Ct. 841 (1935).
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It would appear that Attorney General Sargent in his report for 192781 had
in mind an Elgin type of case when he said:
"In recent years industrial and manufacturing corporations have ac-
quired ownership or control of numerous railroads, comparatively small in
size, but important, nevertheless, because of their strategic locations and the
large volume of interstate traffic hauled by them. While operating as and
enjoying all the privileges and powers of common carriers, generally
speaking these roads are but mere departments of the industrial corpora-
tions which own or control them and whose traffic is transported by them.
The statute does not forbid the ownership of the roads by corporations,
yet the evils of discrimination and preference resulting from such owner-
ship are equally detrimental as when the carrier owns the manufacturing
or producing company.
"Amendment of the commodity clause was recommended in the annual
reports for the years 1910 to 1917, and a bill for this purpose was intro-
duced before the Sixty-third Congress, third session (H. R. 20470).1"82
(Italics supplied.)
It is submitted that if the Borah-Gillette bill becomes a law, a repetition of
the Delaware & Hudson, the Lackawanna and the Elgin doctrines will not
occur.
'Pp. 26, 27.
"See supra note 79.
